Thursday, April 16, 2015

Digital Forensics vs. Data Extraction



 
April 16, 2015

Digital Forensics vs. Data Extraction

I was having lunch the other day with a good friend who is a very well-trained & accomplished Digital Forensic Examiner for the Virginia State Police.  He and I often get together and talk about trends in the industry, past cases, tools that work and tools that don’t among other things (we’re both avid motorcyclists).  He mentioned something again to me recently that I’ve heard him mentioned in the past.  “Forensics is all but dead”, he says. “Almost everyone now is just doing data extraction & reporting, not forensics.”

This comment spawned some more thought from me on the topic.  Is forensics almost dead?  There are several factors at play, not the least of which is the ubiquitous nature of digital forensics practices within government sectors.  These factors encompass personnel, practice, cost & overall expertise, to name a few.  I, for one, would like to think that forensics is not dead, rather going through an evolution of sorts, as most technology-oriented fields do over time.  So what’s the difference between digital forensics and data extraction?  Plenty!

Data Extraction & Reporting

I propose a hypothetical case:  Agent Smith is an investigative field agent.  He works child exploitation crimes for the Mayberry Police Department.  He receives an anonymous cybertip from the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) that John Jones, who lives in Mayberry, has numerous images of child pornography on his smart phone.  Agent Smith does his due diligence in background case work and goes to visit Mr. Jones at his home for a knock-and-talk. 

Jones consents to talking to Agent Smith and further consents to have his phone examined, but refuses to let Agent Smith take the phone with him.  Smith pulls out his field kit, hooks up the phone to his laptop and starts the extraction.  Jones admits to nothing, the extraction is complete and a brief review on-scene of the images on the phone indicates there is illegal material, so Smith seizes the phone and arrests Jones based upon the images he found on-scene.  Now Agent Smith needs to dig further into the evidence to prove the case, but does he? 

Part of the problem and delicate balance with easy-to-use forensic tools (especially mobile forensic tools) is that they’re easy to use.  Point, click, extract, view, report, done!  This is simple data extraction, not digital forensics.  While some of the methods employed to acquire the data may be mostly forensically sound and/or within best practices, that’s about where the forensics ends.  The practice of data extraction simply pulls out the data Agent Smith needs to prove his case, not necessarily the whole story.  How did the images get on the device?  Who put them there?  When were they created?  Who else may have had access to the device (the anonymous tipster, perhaps)?  What additional inculpatory or exculpatory evidence may be present on the device?  In short, what does the whole picture look like?  These are questions that go mostly unanswered by simple data extraction & reporting.  This practice makes the evidence look very damning and very simple, where it may not be either. 

The Forensic Difference

Digital Forensics in the simplest definition goes far beyond simple data extraction.  Forensics looks at all of the available evidence with an open mind, objectively looking to prove or disprove the case from the start and looking to recover whatever relevant evidence that may be present.  The practice of forensics also looks much deeper than what can be found on the surface level.  Forensics seeks to answer questions like:

  • Are there old partitions on the disk that can be recovered?  If so, what evidence might they contain to help prove or disprove the theory of the case?

  • Are there deleted items in unallocated and/or file slack space that may provide proof of an attempt to cover up evidence?

  •  Are there file fragments that could be recovered and/or pieced together to provide a clearer picture of what may have been going on at the time of the incident?

  •  Are there logs of network connections, operating system journal entries, registry artifacts, encrypted or other data that needs to be examined at the hexadecimal level to put the pieces of the puzzle together?

All of these questions and more encompass just the basic differences between simple data extraction and digital forensics, which is much more complex.  It also requires much more training and hands-on experience.  I can honestly say that I don’t think I’ve ever conducted a true digital forensic examination where I didn’t have the need to research file types, headers, footers, applications and any number of other assorted case-specific items to help figure out what activity may have been going on with regard to the submitted device(s) and report those findings accurately & intelligently.  Indeed, digital forensics is true investigative work, not simply a point-and-click approach to recovering evidence.

Rationale

So why do so many field and some lab practitioners do data extraction rather than forensics?  There are several reasons.  The first, and easiest to explain, is laziness.  This may shock you, but some people are just plain lazy.  They can take a test, pass a certification and have all the on-paper credentials, but if they’re lazy and simply don’t want to do the work, none of that really matters.  The next factor is time, which can be closely related to laziness.  In the government sectors especially, examiners are pressured to turn over more cases in less time, especially when it comes to mobile devices.  A true digital forensic examination takes time and, oddly enough, some governmental supervisors don’t understand that.  It is entirely possible that a 64 GB smart phone or tablet full of valuable evidence could take much longer to examine than a 1TB hard drive that doesn’t really have much evidence at all.  Ask the bean-counters to wrap their heads around that one!

Along with extensive time goes money, but with digital forensics, it goes beyond that.  It takes not only an extensive investment in money, but time as well to get an examiner to a competent state.  In order to train a digital forensic examiner to be proficient, knowledgeable and effective requires a huge commitment.  Point-and-click classes take less time and are cheaper than weeks or months of in-depth digital forensic training and hands-on experience.  To add insult to injury, consider this:  I have a friend with whom I attended BCERT – a 5-week computer forensic “boot camp” of sorts.  He works at a local law enforcement agency at the level of Sergeant conducting digital forensic examinations.  He’s been at it for years and is a go-to resource for me whenever I have a question.  If he chooses to advance his career in law enforcement to the next rank (Lieutenant), he would have to quit doing forensics, go back in uniform on patrol and essentially give up that investment he and his department have made, thus starting all over again with a new, green examiner.  This practice is not limited to my friend’s department and is in fact commonplace in law enforcement and other government sectors.  What sense does that make?  Good question.  But the ultimate outcome is departments don’t want to spend that mountain of money to train somebody to my friend’s level again (and again), so they take the easy route:  Train them to get just what we need, i.e., data extraction. 

Conclusions

It seems to be a no-brainer - Trained, equipped, effective examiners are in the best interest of conducting thorough investigations and thus proving or disproving a case, which is in the best interest of justice.  Unfortunately, the general reality doesn’t reflect that.  Since I started in digital forensics in 2008, I’ve seen several cycles of examiners at the government level.  The highly-trained ones get cycled out and the newer ones have less and less training & experience at actually performing any forensics.  Conversely, the gap is widening between those who stick with the practice of digital forensics, whether it be in private or government practice, and those who are constantly in the refresh cycle of digital forensics. The smart get smarter & better and the newer ones keep doing data extraction, often not even submitting evidence to the lab unless it’s a “high-profile” case. 

This gap will undoubtedly get larger and the numbers of practitioners conducting data extractions will grow, while a few of us are continually staying up-to-date & trying to hone our skills.  At some point, the house of cards has to fall, but until it does, I really wish those doing simple data extraction would stop using the F-word: Forensics.

Author:
Patrick J. Siewert, SCERS, BCERT, LCE
Principal Consultant
Professional Digital Forensic Consulting, LLC
Based in Richmond, Virginia
Available Globally

About the Author:

Patrick Siewert is the Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, based in Richmond, Virginia.  In 15 years of law enforcement, he investigated hundreds of high-tech crimes, incorporating digital forensics into the investigations, and was responsible for investigating some of the highest jury and plea bargain child exploitation cases in Virginia court history.  A graduate of both SCERS and BCERT (among others), Siewert continues to hone his digital forensic expertise in the private sector while growing his consulting business marketed toward litigators, professional investigators and corporations.
Twitter: ProDigital4n6


Thursday, April 9, 2015

Forensicator Podcast #100: Dr. Glenn Dardick

April 9, 2015

In our first Forensicator podcast, Patrick Siewert, Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, interviews Dr. Glenn Dardick of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.  Dr. Dardick discusses the evolution of digital forensics, current & future trends and highlights several industry-standard tools.

The podcast may be found at:

https://soundcloud.com/pro-digital-forensics/forensicator-no-100-glenn-dardick

Enjoy and please leave us some feedback!



Author:
Patrick J. Siewert, SCERS, BCERT, LCE
Principal Consultant
Professional Digital Forensic Consulting, LLC
Based in Richmond, Virginia
Available Globally

About the Author:
Patrick Siewert is the Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, based in Richmond, Virginia.  In 15 years of law enforcement, he investigated hundreds of high-tech crimes, incorporating digital forensics into the investigations, and was responsible for investigating some of the highest jury and plea bargain child exploitation cases in Virginia court history.  A graduate of both SCERS and BCERT (among others), Siewert continues to hone his digital forensic expertise in the private sector while growing his consulting business marketed toward litigators, professional investigators and corporations.
Twitter: ProDigital4n6

Thursday, April 2, 2015

Cyber Dust Privacy Claims Debunked



April 2, 2015

Cyber Dust Privacy Claims Debunked

One of the most popular experiments we’ve performed, and associated blog articles we’ve written, through the first quarter of 2015 was our testing of “private” mobile app, Cyber Dust.  In fact, as of the publication of this article, that blog alone has garnered over 1600 views and climbing.  This is due in part to the popularity of the app, the consumer push for user privacy, the marketing efforts of app bank-roller Mark Cuban, a Cyber Dust Podcast interview we did with a big fan of the app and some feverish tweeting on our behalf.  But some recent updated and more in-depth testing by Heather Mahalik has brought up even more questions about the privacy claims of this app.  At this point, it’s probably safe to say the initial claims of the app’s privacy were very much false, calling into question any future claims the app developers may put forth about future iterations of the app.

Review

For those of you who may not have read our previous article about light forensic testing we performed on Cyber Dust (linked here: http://prodigital4n6.blogspot.com/2015/01/searching-for-artifacts-in-private.html) and in the interests of full disclosure, we’ll provide a brief review of what took place earlier this year, both by Pro Digital examiners and Heather Mahalik of SANS.

In December of 2014, I became aware about the mobile app Cyber Dust through the marketing efforts of Mark Cuban and my role as a digital forensic examiner.  Cuban was tweeting about the app’s privacy and we had this brief exchange on twitter subsequently:

Twitter conversation between @Prodigital4n6 and @mcuban from December, 2014


Putting Cuban’s ignorance about mobile data storage aside (in fairness, he may have been using “hard drive” as a layman’s term), I decided to take him up on what I saw as a definite forensic challenge to see if any artifacts could be recovered.
Long story short, we were able to recover some artifacts through some very basic controlled testing, including user names such as Cuban’s public user name on Cyber Dust and dictionary entries which translated to message strings typed into the device on an Android Smart Phone.  While these artifacts weren’t a direct indictment of Cuban’s claims, they certainly led to the conclusion that the app itself may be private, but the platform on which the app is installed will also have great bearing on what, if any, artifacts are recoverable.

Updated Findings

As I learned during a SANS webcast in March, SANS FOR585 Instructor & mobile forensic guru, Heather Mahalik performed some even more in-depth testing on a more recent version of the app and found much more.  As you can see in the SANS webcast linked here (https://www.sans.org/webcasts/smartphone-security-stronger-forensic-methods-weaker-99887) Heather was able to recover full message text that was double-encoded in base 64.  The translation of this double-encoding was simple and proved that the claim that “it never touches a hard drive anywhere” is simply not true.  Certain messages – perhaps all messages – are stored locally on the device.  They’re just not viewable in Unicode or ASCII as one would search for, thus requiring a trained forensic examiner to take some extra steps to translate the messages, but rest assured, they’re there! 

The responses both Heather and I received from Cyber Dust developers became aware of these findings were curious at best.  To paraphrase, the explanation was given that Heather’s tests were performed on an earlier version of the app in which the data was not encrypted.  The developer(s) insisted the same data is now encrypted in the current versions of the app and therefore, not recoverable.  Methinks they’re missing the point.
 
Take-Aways

I’d like to think the developers of Cyber Dust were simply unaware the curious contrarians like me, Heather Mahalik and other mobile forensicators wouldn’t put Cyber Dust through its paces, but that’s what we do.  Tell us we can’t find it and we’ll look through the weeds as long as we need to in order to find it and Heather certainly did just that.  What’s more disturbing and, arguably almost fraudulent is that Mark Cuban has repeatedly pushed forth in the media that the reason he bank-rolled Cyber Dust is so users could have complete privacy from both corporations and the government.  Indeed, his impetus for bank-rolling the app was a lengthy SEC investigation in which his emails, text messages & other electronic communications were requested as part of discovery in the case.  These tests have shown that, whether in government or in the private sector, there exists forensic examiners with the ability to recover messages stored within the Cyber Dust app, further disputing the claim that the data doesn’t get stored anywhere. 

The updated app may have encrypted the data that Heather recovered, but that still doesn’t address the fact that the data IS stored on the device.  And the fact that the data IS stored on the device, whether encrypted or not, is a direct contradiction to Cuban’s claims that the data “doesn’t touch a hard drive anywhere”.  The replies from Cyber Dust developers overlooks this contradiction and really doesn’t address it at all. 

Moving forward, Cyber Dust has some issues with it’s users who are truly interested in data privacy.  Now that Cuban’s claim(s) have been proven completely false, how are users supposed to believe claims of future privacy?  Are Cyber Dust developers simply preying on their user’s ignorance of technical terms like double-encoding and encryption?  And what if the alleged new encryption algorithm they’re using in current versions is cracked, thus allowing examiners to recover messages as Heather Mahalik did? Can the developers ever get to a place where no messages are stored on the device? 

These are all serious questions Cyber Dust, the developers and even Mark Cuban himself need to answer before they will be able to restore any faith in their app’s privacy.  Don’t forget, roughly the same thing happened to Snap Chat when they claimed nothing was saved.  Is the same fate in store for Cyber Dust? 
Only time will tell…

Author:
Patrick J. Siewert, SCERS, BCERT, LCE
Principal Consultant
Professional Digital Forensic Consulting, LLC
Based in Richmond, Virginia
Available Globally

About the Author:
Patrick Siewert is the Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, based in Richmond, Virginia.  In 15 years of law enforcement, he investigated hundreds of high-tech crimes, incorporating digital forensics into the investigations, and was responsible for investigating some of the highest jury and plea bargain child exploitation cases in Virginia court history.  A graduate of both SCERS and BCERT (among others), Siewert continues to hone his digital forensic expertise in the private sector while growing his consulting business marketed toward litigators, professional investigators and corporations.
Twitter: ProDigital4n6

Note:  While much of the forensic work in this article was conducted by Heather Mahalik, please note, she is not an author of this blog.  Her forensic work on Cyber Dust was cited to reinforce the statements made in this article.


UPDATE:
Yes, this is an update to an update...
Shortly after posting this article and tweeting the link to Mr. Cuban, I received this email from an address reportedly belonging to Mark Cuban:


At this time, no reply has been sent.  It is interesting that the "f word" was cited in the email.  In the attempt to give more benefit of the doubt to Cuban and the developers of Cyber Dust, I edited the phrase "...almost fraudulent" to "arguably almost fraudulent".

When writing these articles, I make every effort to be transparent and objective within the subject matter (yes, I edited Mr. Cuban's email address for his privacy), but as a trained investigator, forensic examiner and former law enforcement officer, it's been ingrained in me, and those in the field, to seek facts and point them out, no matter who likes them or how popular they may be.

As far as good business, I won't argue with a billionaire about what is or is not good business.  I'll only state that in every contact with every client, we are as honest, truthful, forthright and pragmatic as possible, even if it means doing so doesn't earn their business.  Maybe that will end up being a bad business model, but it's worked pretty good so far and I will continue to push forward the Pro Digital model of business integrity as long as I own the company.  If you're interested in our Mission Statement, you may read it at: http://www.prodigital4n6.com/about.html

Thanks for your continued readership.
Verital et. Aequitas

-Patrick Siewert