Showing posts with label Apple. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Apple. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 10, 2021

Apple’s New CSAM Detection Policy Analysis

 August 10, 2021


Apple’s New CSAM Detection Policy Analysis


Several times a year, there seem to be current events or topics that strike a chord both inside and beyond the digital forensic community.  We’ve discussed these in previous articles with regard to the Carpenter v. US decision and Apple’s previous spat with the FBI in the wake of the San Bernardino, CA terrorist attack.


As no stranger to these current event discussions (i.e., controversy) when it comes to matters of privacy and cooperation with Law Enforcement, last week we had another “bombshell” dropped by Apple that in a new US-based update, they will be subjecting user’s on-device photos to hash analysis attempting to track down images of known child sex abuse material (CSAM) that may be uploaded to iCloud and forwarding this information for follow-up to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) or other law enforcement investigative entity.  Here, we’ll discuss how this works and explore both sides of the issue.







How CSAM Detection Works


It is a commonplace practice for internet (or electronic) service providers (ISPs/ESPs) to work in conjunction with law enforcement to detect known CSAM images.  The first question naturally is, what is a known CSAM image?  Simply put, an image becomes known CSAM when a victim has been positively identified in the image.  This routinely comes through the investigation of new/unknown images and positive identification on the children in those images.  Often times, the images are within a series, depicting child sex abuse of one or more victims in the same setting with the same abuser and around the same time frame.  Law enforcement entities such as NCMEC, DHS and the FBI all maintain file hash databases of these images for use by law enforcement in investigation.  These file hash values are used to track down purveyors of child pornography across peer-to-peer networks, as well as those who may upload and share CSAM images to cooperating ESPs such as DropBox, Gmail, Yahoo, Kik, etc.  


Once a known CSAM image has been identified by the ESP by hash value, the offending party’s account information as well as the specific date/time of upload and manner of upload are all provided to NCMEC as an investigative lead.  NCMEC then performs a variety of open-source intelligence gathering on the offending party and provides the information to law enforcement in what is known as a Cybertip.  An affiliate or cooperating law enforcement agency receives the Cybertip for investigative follow up, which can include knock-and-talk, search warrant, additional investigation or a combination of these (or other) investigative methods.  Some Cybertips go nowhere.  Some, like one I worked while a member of law enforcement, are not eligible for a search warrant, but end up in a knock-and-talk, consent search and confession from the offending party of not only possessing CSAM, but molestation of his 10 year-old step daughter.  The value of Cybertips in the hands of properly trained investigators cannot be overstated.


Whether or not you know it, you are explicitly agreeing to this process in the End User License Agreement (EULA) by using any of these services.



One Side of the Argument: Privacy


Privacy is understandably an important issue to users of technology across the spectrum.  Apple has traditionally been very privacy-centric in their practices, including refusal to help the FBI unlock the iPhone belonging to a terrorist couple who killed several people.  And privacy is very important to almost all users.  The argument here on the privacy side is that, by Apple’s own statement, they are installing an agent on iDevices to subject photos to a hashing algorithm and then alert law enforcement if a “threshold” of CSAM content is discovered.  This is a half-step further in a direction than what Google, Yahoo or Kik do to detect CSAM content in that they detect content uploaded to their servers and report what is suspected CSAM to NCMEC.  Apple is detecting content on individual devices and reporting suspected CSAM content that may be shared via iCloud which meets the “threshold” to NCMEC. 




In some spirited discussion about this new policy on Linked In recently, it was pointed out that this may be a violation of a user’s 4th Amendment rights against unreasonable search & seizure because Apple is acting as a would-be agent of law enforcement and “searching” people’s photos on their devices without a warrant.  We’ll discuss this a bit further in the next section, but this is a valid argument on its face.  But like with most things in life, the devil is in the details.  


Another point brought up in discussion was the fact that Apple is projecting that they have the technology to scan files on your device generally, which could be more of a concern in the future.  This is very powerful technology that has the capability of infiltrating people’s devices without their express knowledge and potentially providing information to a third party, possibly for criminal investigation.  Furthermore, it opens the door for a would-be hacking entity to exploit this new door that Apple has opened on a much wider scale.  The security and data privacy implications may only be in the early stages.


The Other Side of the Argument: Child Safety


As a former law enforcement investigator on the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, I can assure you that proliferation of CSAM images across the internet is a real problem.  While doing this work also in the private sector, I’m sometimes asked how law enforcement knows that the images are of children and not simply people in their upper-teens who could easily be mistaken for someone over 18.  They know.  The most egregious examples of CSAM material involve infants and toddlers in sexually exploitative scenarios that no investigator can ever un-see.  These images are by-in-large not questionable in age or physical development.  They are small children, even sometimes babies.  Are there exceptions to this?  Yes.  Teens who possess smart devices also possess the ability to make their own images and share them with whomever they wish, particularly if their parent/guardian is not tech-savvy or they have not been taught the impact that the decision to share explicit photos can be long-lasting when it comes to the internet.  These images sometimes become part of criminal investigations as well, and they can be added to the CSAM database if the correct criteria and procedures are in place.


So why is Apple’s decision generally a good one for law enforcement?  The approach that investigators take with CSAM images is that a child is victimized every time these images are viewed or shared.  This then requires law enforcement investigation and intervention to help stem the flow of these images across the internet and decrease child sexual exploitation.  Apple’s cooperation in this mission opens a door not previously available without another third-party alerting NCMEC of images potentially stored on a device.  Additionally, with the proliferation of human trafficking, particularly of missing children, Apple’s new policy gives law enforcement another tool in the proverbial toolbox to help track down and locate missing children.




The argument that this practice goes against 4th Amendment protections against unreasonable search & seizure is a compelling one.  But there are some arguments to the contrary.  First, no one has a Constitutional right to own an iPhone.  If you don’t like Apple’s new policy, switch to Android.  Second, whenever we get a new i-Device (iPhone, iPad, iPod, etc.), we are prompted to “Agree” to Apple’s terms of service in the EULA, and this is in perpetuity for the time we use their software and hardware.  It is Apple’s discretion to change or updated the terms of this policy, as they have done recently with implementation of this new practice.  In short, we gave them permission to do this.  Finally, an argument can be made that while Apple’s practice for detecting CSAM images goes a half-step beyond other ESPs, the protection of children from sexual exploitation is worth whatever freedom we give up.  There is a tried & true adage that liberty and security rarely go hand-in-hand.  We frequently give up liberty for security.  Been to the airport lately?  


Finally, the argument was also brought up about mistaken identification of traders of CSAM images through this new process.  If we take Apple’s statement at face-value, there is a one in “one trillion chance per year” that this could happen, meaning it is far less than statistically insignificant.  I’m also quite certain the army of Legal Counsel at Apple have thoroughly reviewed and signed-off on this practice.




Wrapping It Up


This is a hot topic that won’t soon go away.  Apple has caught heat many times for many different approaches over the years and this is just the latest measure to garner such attention.  It is ultimately up to us as the consumers of Apple to decide… Do we want to give up a tiny bit of privacy (for now) in furtherance of the mission to stem the flow of child sex abuse images or do we care more about privacy over the content of our devices?  It’s a personal choice and fortunately, we still have the freedom to choose in the United States!


NOTE:  Article with additional information published on 8/9/2021:  https://www-bbc-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.bbc.com/news/technology-58145943.amp 


Author: 

Patrick J. Siewert

Founder & Principal Consultant

Professional Digital Forensic Consulting, LLC 

Virginia DCJS #11-14869

Based in Richmond, Virginia

Available Wherever You Need Us!



We Find the Truth for a Living!


Computer Forensics -- Mobile Forensics -- Specialized Investigation

About the Author:

Patrick Siewert is the Founder & Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, based in Richmond, Virginia (USA).  In 15 years of law enforcement, he investigated hundreds of high-tech crimes to precedent-setting results and continues to support litigation cases and corporations in his digital forensic practice.  Patrick is a graduate of SCERS & BCERT and holds several vendor-neutral and specific certifications in the field of digital forensics and high-tech investigation and is a court-certified expert witness.  He continues to hone his digital forensic expertise in the private sector while growing his consulting & investigation business servicing litigators and their clients, professional investigators and corporations, while keeping in touch with the public safety community as a Law Enforcement Instructor.

Email:  Inquiries@ProDigital4n6.com

Web: https://ProDigital4n6.com

Pro Digital Forensic Consulting on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/professional-digital-forensic-consulting-llc

Patrick Siewert on LinkedIn:  https://www.linkedin.com/in/patrick-siewert-92513445/  

Saturday, November 3, 2018

FAQ Video Series: Mobile Forensics

What is mobile forensics and how can you use it for your case? In this edition of our Frequently Asked Questions videos, we provide an overview and answers questions about deleted and recovered text messages and more. Apple and Android are different and it's important that your mobile forensic analyst knows the proper approach to the specific device(s) in your case.

 

For more information, visit prodigital4n6.com, call 804-588-9877 or email: inquiries@prodigital4n6.com

FAQ Video Series: Cellular Call Detail Records - Analysis and Mapping

In this video, Pro Digital Principal Consultant Patrick Siewert talks about cellular provider call detail records analysis and mapping. He describes what it is, how the records are obtained, which types of cases can utilize the records, examples of what may be shown in court, and what's required to obtain the information. This type of data can commonly be used in Insurance Fraud investigations, divorce cases/custody disputes and validation of an opposing analysts findings in criminal or civil litigation.

Pro Digital also offers these services to prosecutors offices working major crimes who may not have access to analysts with the expertise to interpret and map these records.


 

Cellular Provider Record Retention Periods: prodigital4n6.com/cellular-record-retention-periods/ For more information, visit prodigital4n6.com, call us at 804-588-9877 or email: inquiries@prodigital4n6.com

Monday, March 7, 2016

Apple vs. the F.B.I: Some Forensic Implications



March 7, 2016

Apple vs. the F.B.I: Some Forensic Implications

Never one to let a good legal-tech story opportunity go to waste, I started ruminating over the multitude of implications in the Apple vs. FBI matter.  There are certainly many factors which will inevitably lead to a decision.  These include legal, technical, ethical, moral and philosophical factors, many of which have been (correctly or incorrectly) espoused upon by pundits, politicians and bloggers. One of the main considerations, however, deals with the practice of mobile forensics and how any evidence gained from the hacked iPhone may affect future legal proceedings.

The Problem with the Request

Most mobile forensic practitioners will tell you that mobile forensics is not true forensics.  This is because data on the device is always changing and cannot be proverbially frozen in a state when it is seized due to near-constant network connectivity and instant, minor changes being made to the device.  Further, in order to obtain the data off the device, we generally have to alter a minimal amount of data to allow the acquisition computer to “handshake” the device and get the data extraction.  Without boring any readers with the technical aspects of what goes on in this process, suffice it to say, this is the case in virtually every single mobile forensic data extraction performed.



The problem with the FBI’s court order to Apple is it is forcing them to alter data even more than the normal procedure calls for.  The request calls for several changes to be made to the iOS operating system on the device in question to allow 1) unlimited attempts at a brute-force unlock (i.e., hack) of the device without the threat of a 10-tries-and-out data wipe and 2) to alter the iOS operating system to allow successive attempts at the brute-force unlock without the hassle of the time-out feature in between attempts, which works its way up to 1 hour.  Simply put, the FBI doesn’t want to have to potentially wait up to 10,000 hours or so to unlock the device.  None of these alterations of the operating system have ever been performed on any other evidence device, which opens the flood-gates to many questions with regard to exactly what data is being altered if and when Apple performs this procedure on the device in question.  

The Daubert Standard

In 1993, forensic science in the courtroom got a proverbial slap in the face through what is now known as the Daubert Standard (See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579).  The case involved forensic expert procedures and testimony from a witness and dictated how forensic expert work and testimony should be judged from that point forward.  The standards and issues are as follows:

  • What is the basic theory and has it been tested?
  • Are there standards controlling the technique?
  • Has the theory or technique been subjected to peer review and publication?
  • What is the known or potential error rate?
  • Is there general acceptance of the theory?
  • Has the expert adequately accounted for alternative explanations?
  • Has the expert unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion?
I propose that most (or all) of the above-listed questions cannot be answered in the case of Apple vs. the FBI.  The theory has not been tested (at least not that we know of).  There are no standards controlling the technique because the technique has, in theory, never been attempted.  Because it’s never been tested, it has not been subjected to peer review and publication.  We have no idea the error rate (because it’s never been attempted).  Acceptance of the theory is very much up for debate and is one big reason why the case has garnered so much attention.  Whether or not the actual person performing this procedure would have to come to court in any subsequent proceeding would answer the last two points, but again, the procedure has never been done before, so how do we defend against any conclusions that are drawn as a result of the procedure?

Further, the results of the procedure need to be validated, repeatable and defensible.  If the evidence the FBI gains from the phone leads to criminal charges and that criminal defendant hires an independent digital forensic analyst to perform a data extraction, analysis & reporting, how is he or she supposed to facilitate that?  How is this procedure repeatable to an independent expert?  Short answer, it isn’t… At least not under current circumstances.

The End is a Good Place to Start

A common theme in this blog is one coined by Stephen Covey: Begin with the end in mind.  In this particular case, the FBI has a professional and ethical responsibility to begin with the end in mind and answer the questions, what do you hope to learn?  What is your objective?  What will you ultimately do with this data, should it present evidence of a crime?
The rules are in place for a reason.  Innocent people get mixed up in investigations just like guilty people do.  Everyone deserves a fair shake in the court system and the heart of forensic science is to find the truth based upon the evidence, no matter where that leads.  So before we, as a society, choose sides with regard to who is the “good guy” and who is the “bad guy” in this case, perhaps we should ask the critical questions about the end-goal.  Often times, that will direct you where you need to go with regard to proper procedure.

Author:
Patrick J. Siewert, SCERS, BCERT, LCE
Principal Consultant
Professional Digital Forensic Consulting, LLC
Virginia DCJS #11-14869
Based in Richmond, Virginia
Available Globally

We Find the Truth for a Living!

About the Author:
Patrick Siewert is the Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, based in Richmond, Virginia.  In 15 years of law enforcement, he investigated hundreds of high-tech crimes, incorporating digital forensics into the investigations, and was responsible for investigating some of the highest jury and plea bargain child exploitation cases in Virginia court history.  A graduate of both SCERS, BCERT, the Reid School of Interview & Interrogation and various online investigation schools (among others), Siewert continues to hone his digital forensic expertise in the private sector while growing his consulting & investigation business marketed toward litigators, professional investigators and corporations.
Twitter: @ProDigital4n6

Saturday, February 20, 2016

Clash of the Titans: Apple vs. The U.S. Government



February 20, 2016

Clash of the Titans: Apple vs. The U.S. Government

I’ve had many spirited discussions and read many thought-provoking articles since the Federal Magistrate ordered Apple to cooperate (even more than they already have) with the FBI in the investigation of alleged San Bernardino terrorist Sayed Farook and his locked iPhone 5c.  Most of the arguments on both sides of the issue are compelling.  I’m not here to make a case as to whether or not Apple should comply with the order or fight the legal battle, rather to bring out some points I haven’t read to date about the case.

The Legal Precedent

Research of the legality of the Government’s order yields invocation of the All Writs Act for justification of the order.  The All Writs Act was enacted in 1789, long before technology was even a glimmer of what it is today.  In a nutshell, the Act allows the Government to compel a private business to utilize measures already in place for benefit of the Government’s use with a valid court order.  The emphasis on the previous sentence is purposeful because, if we take Apple CEO Tim Cook at his word, they do not already have the means to do what the order dictates they do.  This is no doubt (at least part of) the legal grounds upon which the attorneys at Apple will stand in their challenge of this order.  If they judge Cook and Apple’s current abilities as truthful, the judgement may be clear.

The Value of the Data

Let’s be clear about the circumstances of this case:  The suspects are dead.  There are no civil or criminal charges to be brought upon them in order to bring them to justice.  That fact alone makes the information the FBI is seeking much more in the realm of intelligence vs. evidence.  While it’s true that evidence of other conspirators or plans may exists on the phone, it is likely that the value of the data which the FBI seeks falls much more in the intelligence category than it does evidence.  This is an important distinction.  If the FBI were seeking to gather evidence to prosecute two imprisoned would-be terrorists for their heinous crimes, the value of the data would be unquestionable and Apple would arguably have a moral responsibility to comply.  However, the intelligence on the phone is largely speculative.  In fact, all reports suggest the data would amount to a month and a half worth of intelligence because the FBI has already lawfully obtained the iCloud backup of Farook’s phone.  So to be clear, the FBI is speculating that roughly 45 days worth of additional data may unlock the keys to further plots, actors, etc.  Is that a reasonable investigatory conclusion or a fishing expedition?



The Mobile Forensic Implications

Consider that if Apple does what the order states, they are altering the data on the phone, which is in direct conflict of accepted forensic methods & practices.  Yes, I know that in mobile forensics the data is often altered a very minimal amount to allow us to access it, but let’s say that the order is successful and Apple performs this data-altering procedure and the data leads to a criminal charge or charges.  Now, the agents who performed this extraction to get this evidence need to defend their actions in court.  How do you defend something that’s never been attempted before?  Further, the procedure needs to be replicable by other practitioners in the field and validated.  Is that possible in this case?  At the heart of it, what is the difference between what the Court Order is dictating and a simple jail-break of the iPhone?

These points touch on just a portion of any number of legal scientific arguments that call the procedures dictated within the order at least somewhat into question.  As my article Read This Before You Use the IP Box states, getting the data at all costs isn’t necessarily in the best interest of digital forensic science or practice.

The Responsibility of the Data

At the heart of many arguments I’ve read is Apple’s “moral responsibility to society” to do what some dictate is the “right thing”.  But what is mostly overlooked is the fact that Farook was a government employee and his phone was a government-owned phone.  Perhaps the true responsibility lies upon the government employer to have put measures into place to allow access to the device at an enterprise level so this large legal-tech battle wouldn’t have to be taking place, further costing tax-payers and Apple millions of dollars.  Just some food for thought.

Sadly, whomever was in charge of the issuance of those devices at Farook’s workplace didn’t have the foresight to put those measures in place.  It would be interesting to see if the same organization has since put appropriate measures and policies into place for their issued smart phones or if they have moved on, not learning from their mistakes.  There is no ‘chicken and egg’ argument here.  The ultimate responsibility for access to that device and data lies with Farook’s employer and they failed at that responsibility.

The Perfect Storm

It is fairly likely that the legality of the Court Order will ultimately be argued and decided by the Supreme Court of the U.S. (SCOTUS).  Unfortunately, this case has come about in a period of political and institutional upheaval.  Not only are we in the midst of a very contentious Presidential race, but to add to the fervor, Justice Antonin Scalia has died and the filling of his seat on the SCOTUS is very much in question.  I will not speculate how Scalia would have ruled in this case, but I will put forth that his voice would most certainly have been heard.  Will the next SCOTUS Justice’s voice be heard just as much?  Will they have just as much of an impact?

Interestingly, in my observance of this debate, I’ve seen where people from both sides of the political spectrum have weighed in with unexpected opinions.  It seems that the issue boils down to personal privacy vs. Government overreach.  Who knows, perhaps this is one case where the “D” or “R” next to your representative’s name won’t have as much meaning as their personal philosophy & beliefs about privacy and the role of government.

Clash of the Titans

There’s an old adage when it comes to challenging the Government: “You can’t fight City Hall”.  In case you don’t already know, this is because the Government has unlimited resources to fight any case they choose.  Most people I know, even in popular/celebrity culture, do not have unlimited resources.  But Apple isn’t a person, it’s a company, and one of the largest (if not THE largest) in the world.  They have resources.  Billions and billions of dollars in cash to fight this fight.  I predict this will be the seminal legal-tech case of our time.  There will be others, but no other case presents the challenges of modern technology, the power it harnesses and the privacy concerns it brings about vs. the purported “common good” that the government strives to provide.

Just like many other bloggers and pundits have speculated that Apple can do what the order calls for “in 30 seconds”, I’ve heard from insiders that the FBI already has the ability to bypass the passcodes on i-Devices.  Is it true?  Perhaps not.  But if it is, that means the U.S. Government is using this case to make a statement.  It means this is a calculated strategy on the part of the U.S. Government to challenge and, as I’m sure they hope, make an example of Apple.  It would also mean that they are taking up a large legal battle under false pretenses.

There’s another old adage that may be appropriate:  “If you’re going to strike at a King, strike to kill!”  Even if Apple loses their fight in the order, they will have made a stand for what they believe in as a business and a service provider.  Even if they lose, they win because they will have conducted a very public, very powerful battle against the biggest titan of them all.  The Government can’t strike to kill Apple because they are kings in their industry.  

Either way, this will be an interesting battle to say the least.  This Digital Forensic practioner will be watching with great interest as the arguments unfold! 


Author:
Patrick J. Siewert, SCERS, BCERT, LCE
Principal Consultant
Professional Digital Forensic Consulting, LLC
Virginia DCJS #11-14869
Based in Richmond, Virginia
Available Globally

We Find the Truth for a Living!

About the Author:
Patrick Siewert is the Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, based in Richmond, Virginia.  In 15 years of law enforcement, he investigated hundreds of high-tech crimes, incorporating digital forensics into the investigations, and was responsible for investigating some of the highest jury and plea bargain child exploitation cases in Virginia court history.  A graduate of both SCERS, BCERT, the Reid School of Interview & Interrogation and various online investigation schools (among others), Siewert continues to hone his digital forensic expertise in the private sector while growing his consulting & investigation business marketed toward litigators, professional investigators and corporations.
Twitter: @ProDigital4n6